I have blogged about minimum pricing before; both on its
possible illegality, and on the SWA’s approach. Now a Scottish court has heldthat there is no problem in law with the proposals, and so it would appear
minimum pricing will become a reality. (Except that other EU states are
challenging the measure at a higher level, as reported here).
I don’t propose to go through all the aspects of the
judgment, which is here, at any length. I am more interested in the free
movement of goods (FMG) issue, which I discussed before. This was, as I
understand, the main argument of the SWA. Other arguments, including ones based
on the Scotland/England Acts of Union hardly passed a smell-test.
On the FMG point, it was held that the Scottish measure did
impinge on free movement, but was justified on the basis of the protection of the life and
health of humans (Art 36 TFEU). This is a treaty-enshrined basis that allows
derogation from strict free movement of goods. Lord Doherty held that there was a
legitimate aim, and that the measure was proportionate to that aim.
[55] There is overwhelming
evidence of grave health, social, economic and public order consequences caused
in Scotland as a result of excessive alcohol consumption. Such consumption by
harmful and hazardous drinkers is particularly concerning, and is harmful to
those drinkers and to others. On the basis of the material placed before me I
am in no doubt that reduction of alcohol consumption generally, and reduction
of consumption by hazardous and harmful drinkers in particular, are both
legitimate aims in terms of Article 36.
…
[64] If … alternative measures
would be just as effective as minimum pricing in achieving the legitimate aims
being pursued, the contention that they would be less of an obstacle to freedom
of movement of goods would appear, at least prima
facie, to be logical and have
force…
…
[73] The petitioners [argue] that
excise duty on alcohol can be increased as much as is necessary to raise the
prices of cheaper products to desired levels. Such an approach would not
affect, or target, drinkers of cheaper products only: but it could subject them
to price increases of at least the same order as under minimum pricing. … In
those circumstances [an excise duty] would be no less effective in reducing the
consumption of cheap alcohol or the consumption of alcohol by hazardous and
harmful drinkers.
…
[77] That argument would have been more persuasive if the legitimate aims of
the measures had been to reduce consumption, including consumption by hazardous
and harmful drinkers, to the maximum extent possible regardless of possible
economic or social consequences. However, those are not the aims of the
measures. Rather, the relevant aims are [ [54][striking] a reasonable balance between, on the one hand, public
health and social benefits, and, on the other, intervention in the market … The
Parliament and the Ministers recognised that many people have "a balanced,
positive and enjoyable relationship with alcohol": such drinkers are not
the target of the measures. The major problem is excessive consumption of cheap
alcohol. The measures seek to address this by increasing the price of such
alcohol.]
This is proportionality doing what proportionality does
worst. Proportionality, as a concept, is primarily found in EU law. If measure
is tied to a legitimate aim, and goes no further than necessary to achieve that
aim, it is proportionate. On this occasion, that has the net result of blowing
an FMG argument out the water.
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